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INTRODUCTION 
The principles of modern interna-
tional law recognize the doctrine of 
blockade as a legitimate option between 
states in a declared state of war, giving 
them the right to apply naval power to 
stop all seaborne commerce with the 
enemy, including that carried in neutral 
ships. However, the "legality" of this 
instrument for exercising national 
power is a very tenuous matter in the 
minds of jurists, being circumscribed by 
a number of significant preconditions, 
the absence or violation of any of which 
may void the blockader's claim to legiti-
mate right, and expose him to heated 
controversy. 
The fundamental concept of mari-
time blockade is an ancient one, and, in 
its essence, it seems to be fully in 
harmony with the realities of national 
existence even in a modern world. How-
ever, it is the purpose of this paper to 
suggest that the precise technical condi-
tions surrounding the modern instru-
ment of blockade have overlaid this 
fundamental concept with elements 
which have divorced the doctrine from 
reality. 
The modern doctrine of blockade 
and the associated principles of contra-
band have evolved over centuries, re-
maining basically constant in the princi-
ples invoked but continuously changing 
as to structural details. Thus, there 
appears to be a sound basis for consider-
ing that the current "legal" definition of 
the terms and concept of blockade is 
but the most recent step of an evolu-
tionary process which has not yet ar-
rived at logical maturity. 
That the process might shortly be 
required to respond once more to the 
stress of international conflict seems 
apparent. With few exceptions, those 
modern states having pretensions of 
becoming international makeweights 
have sought to establish for themselves a 
claim to a share in the wealth and 
prestige resultant from international 
carrying trade. Even the Soviet Union, 
long a formidable land power, has begun 
to make its presence felt in the great 
competitive arena formed by the world's 
oceans. Compounding the commercial 
threat of this seaward expansion by the 
Soviets, the United States is faced as well 
with their sponsorship of militant world 
communism through the new medium 
of "wars of liberation." It seems super-
fluous to state that the United States 
today finds itself in a position analogous 
to that of insular Britain in the face of 
Napoleon-a power dependent on sea 
communication with its allies, its 
sources of crucial materials, and its 
markets, opposed by a dedicated and 
ingenious enemy having central lines of 
communication. To confine that threat 
to the limits of continental Europe was 
the aim of Britain's effort in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, while the aim of the 
United States today must also be to 
contain the Communist threat within 
the limits of its existing sphere of 
influence in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
Britain's success against Napoleon 
was gained largely through her intelli-
gent application of all the devices of 
seapower available to her, including that 
of blockade-not a blockade according 
to rules made by scholars and law 
clerks, but one governed by rules born 
of the dictates of necessity and the 
talents of seamen-a viable doctrine, 
responsive less to the protests of diplo-
mats than to the realities of the threat 
to be overcome. 
This paper proposes to review in 
detail the evolutionary process to which 
the concept of maritime blockade has 
been subjected in order to point out the 
historic facility by which nations yield 
up principle in favor of political reality. 
Further, it is intended to illustrate that 
the doctrine of blockade is merely part 
of a larger scheme which is appropriate 
for application as an instrument of 
national power in the complex interna-
tional society of the current century. 
It will not be advocated that the 
"rule of law" so treasured by our 
Western society be overthrown in a 
qucst for temporary advantage. It is 
hoped merely to articulate what is 
believed to be an existing ground swell 
of legal and lay opinion that "laws and 
institutions are constantly tending to 
gravitate. Like clocks, they must be 
occasionally cleansed, and wound up, 
and set to the true time. ,,1 
I-FOUNDATION OF THE LAW 
AND CUSTOM OF BLOCKADE 
In ancient times, conflicts between 
rulers of tribes or the early city-states 
usually resulted in the involvement of 
all political entities adjacent to associ-
ated military operations. Belligerents, as 
the active participants became known, 
always attempted to convert non-
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participators into allies; failing in that, it 
was expected that action could be taken 
to at least insure that the opposition 
would not receive the assistance of 
bystanders. Such action normally re-
sulted in some form of operations 
against the commerce of the neutrals, as 
they later came to be known, and such 
interference was justified on political 
rather than legal grounds, if indeed it 
were thought necessary to justify it at 
all? In those early centuries of human 
violence, the "style" of warfare was 
usually that of the siege against the 
strong points of an enemy rather than 
general campaigns throughout the coun-
tryside. Under such circumstances, little 
need existed among states to formulate 
any sort of legal basis for regulating the 
trade of neutrals with all belligerents, 
since it was clearly unprofitable for an 
apolitical neutral to attempt to continue 
trade with a besieged point when a 
ready market for his goods existed 
among the besiegers. On the other hand, 
neutrals were normally required to con-
tinue trade with any accessible belliger-
ent, since "the discontinuance by a 
neutral of intercourse with either bel-
ligerent, where not an effect of the 
operations taking place ... seemed 
... so plain a form of alliance with or 
subservience to, the other ... "3 that it 
was clearly a political act rather than 
one arguable as a matter oflaw. 
Before it was possible to contemplate 
legal justification for the continuance or 
suspension of commerce with a bellig-
erent by a neutral, it was first necessary 
for the concept of neutrality to become 
in "some" form a recognized institution 
of the law of nations, and until the 
freedom of neutral commerce was in 
some form guaranteed. '>4 This status of 
authorized impartiality of third states 
while war raged between others was not 
formalized and incorporated into the 
law of nations as the institution of 
neutrality until the 16th century.5 Until 
that time, the principle of land warfare 
which forbade all forms of intercourse 
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with hesieged places governed. Toward 
the later portion of the period the 
growth of international commerce in-
tensified the helief that partial neu-
trality was unjust, and rules aimed at 
formalizing the limits of a "just neu-
trality" hegan to evolve. The earliest of 
these rules ended the total interdiction 
of neutral commerce with hesieged 
places hut enjoined neutrals from trans-
porting into such places either armed 
troops or specified materials which 
would tend to mitigate the effects of 
the siege.6 One author points out that 
this relaxation was more significant as 
the estahlishment of a principle rather 
than any meaningful authorization to 
trade, "since places so circumscrihed 
would he very unlikely markets to seek 
with articles not of some immediate 
utility to the defense. "7 
Thus, hy the 16th century, at least 
some elementary rules regulating neutral 
commerce with respect to helligerents 
existed, although they were derived 
principally from the experiences of land 
warfare. It was at this time that the 
unilateral action of one state, Holland, 
introduced into the growing stream of 
international law a new principle, hased 
in part on older precedent. The princi-
ple was that of hlockade, wherehy a 
helligerent has come to he entitled as a 
matter of law to cut off the free access 
of neutral commerce to the ports or 
coast of an enemy.8 
In 1584, while at war with the 
Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch Govern-
ment issued a proclamation (placaat) 
declaring that all Flanders ports then in 
the hands of Spain were under siege 
from the sea, and that no commerce 
would he allowed entry.9 This preten-
sion was hased on the ancient right of a 
hesieger to prevent hy all means avail-
ahle the crossing of a line of investment 
hy a neutral and the fact that the Dutch 
naval forces had considerahle power to 
enforce the declaration on neutrals 
seeking entry. Significantly, no effort 
was made to invest these ports with land 
forces at the same time, although it was 
clearly the Dutch intention "to usc the 
right of siege on an unprecedented 
scale."IO 
The concept of the maritime hlock-
ade thus was estahlished at the end of 
the 16th century, hut hefore any sense 
of legality could he attached to it, it was 
necessary for the puhlicists to hegin the 
process of formalizing the institution hy 
incorporating it into the growing hody 
of writings which we have come to 
know as the law of nations. The most 
renowned of the early puhlicists, 
Grotius, writing in 1624, ohliquely men-
tions the justification for the closure of 
ports as distinct from the idea of con-
current siege hy land forces in the 
following terms: 
For if I cannot defend myself 
without intercepting what is sent, 
necessity ... will give me the right 
to intercept it .... If the introduc-
tion of the supplies impeded me 
in the pursuit of my right, and 
this was open to the knowledge of 
the person who introduced them, 
as if I was [sic] keeping a town 
invested, or ports closed, and a 
surrender or peace was already 
looked for, he will he hound to 
repay me for the damage occa-
sioned hy his fault .... 11 (Em-
phasis added.) 
This early articulation hy Grotius is 
significant for several reasons. First, hy 
the use of the words "keeping a town 
invested, or ports closed," he seems to 
imply that he was considering two 
distinct concepts, one of siege in the 
traditional sense, and the other of 
hlockade in the more modern sense, 
although he fails to use the word 
"hlockade. "12 Secondly, the use of the 
phrase, "and a surrender or peace was 
already looked for," has heen inter-
preted as indicating an essential differ-
ence hetween actual hloekades hacked 
up hy real naval strength as opposed to 
fictitious hlockades laid on only hy 
placaat. I3 It is exactly this point of 
actual vcrsus "paper" blockades that 
latcr became so controversial in the 
cvolution of ncutral rights at sea, and it 
is notcworthy to sce that this issue was 
anticipated in the earliest days of the 
institution. Finally, the statement actu-
ally prohibits all commerce with be-
sicgcd places, since, as noted above, 
such places would have little interest in 
goods not helpful in some way to the 
dcfcnse, and all such goods were his-
torically prohibited. 
In 1630, with Grotius' formulation 
only five years old, the Dutch once 
more desired to apply naval pressure- on 
Flanders, but by this date had not the 
means to apply this new form of siege 
to all ports at the same time. Question-
ing the applicability of blockade under 
these conditions, and fearing to an-
tagonize the now-neutral England, the 
Admiralty of Amsterdam was queried 
for its opinion. The analysis given was 
summed up by a jurist writing in a later 
century, and was to the effect that "the 
rule which obtains in the case of towns, 
which are properly said to be be-
sieged ... extends also to the enemy's 
ports, which when invested by ships, are 
said to be besieged. ,,14 Accordingly, the 
States General announced in a placaat 
dated 9 July 1630, that the Flanders 
coast was blockaded and that neutral 
ships found at any distance from 
Flandcrs intending to call at those ports 
would be confiscated. Further, the 
placaat went on to state that ships 
which succeeded in passing the blockade 
into Flanders ports would remain sub-
ject to confiscation wherever inter-
cepted on the outward voyage.15 Here, 
then, is the source document of the 
modern institution of blockade-all 
commerce to be cut off, without regard 
to its status as contraband, with the 
further claim to vast powers over neu-
tral commerce far removed from the 
actual place of investment. This preten-
tious claim by the Dutch did not remain 
unchallenged, of course. Although the 
blockade thus established did not last 
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very long and no records are available as 
to its results, the swift development of a 
body of treaties between Holland and 
various countries beginning with the 
French in 1646 (all of which rejected 
the broad principles of the 1630 
placaat) indicates vigorous neutral diplo-
matic activity to secure their trade with 
belligerents.16 Such activity continues 
even today. 
As the proponents of the institution 
of blockade, the Dutch continued to 
figure prominently in its development 
so long as they remained a significant 
seapower. Their stewardship of the insti-
tution during this era has been charac-
terized by the English jurist Westlake as 
having been "marked by the widest 
renunciation of the right to interfere 
with neutral commerce, the widest 
actual intederence with it when oppor-
tunity offered, and the absolute refusal 
to recognize [the right to] a similar 
interference with it by others."1 7 The 
Dutch did not remain alone for long, as 
the changing realities of European 
power soon brought the rising seapower 
of England into partnership with them 
in proclaiming a blockade "of France 
and all French possessions" after 1689. 
In this proclamation, both states resur-
rected completely the spirit of the 1630 
Dutch placaat by asserting the intention 
of capturing ships bound for French 
ports wherever found.18 This first 
appearance of England as a blockading 
power should be marked as some sort of 
milestone since she continued to occupy 
that role almost perpetually afterward, 
rapidly assuming from Dutch hands the 
responsibility for enforcing and en-
larging the doctrine. Additionally, West-
lake claims that this event is the 
probable source of the basis for all 
English (and consequently American) 
Prize Law, which, according to repeated 
Admiralty and U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, has been derived from "the 
received law of nations": i.e., the 
placaat of 1630.19 
The British, however, did not 
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vacillate in their application of this new 
doctrine as had the Dutch. They 
claimed the right to interdict com-
pletely neutral commerce bound for 
their opponents and in the years im-
mediately following established the 
British "doctrine of war that, no matter 
by whom carried, goods for an enemy or 
belonging to an enemy could legiti-
mately be taken. '>2 0 From this date 
onward, the history of blockade is 
largely the history of England and her 
rise to maritime greatness. When Britan-
nia ruled the waves, one of the most 




Throughout the 18th century, 
Europe was in an almost constant state 
of war, with Britain sometimes a bel-
ligerent, sometimes neutral, and some-
times cast in both roles simultane-
ously.21 During the period, the crucible 
of frequent and intensifying war not 
only permitted the forging of a refined 
instrument of blockade but forced as 
well the advancement of naval tech-
nology at an accelerated pace. In 1700, 
fleets generally duplicated the practice 
of land armies in retiring to winter 
quarters, leaving only a small force to 
patrol vital areas. By 1800, large squad-
rons were able to be constantly at sea, 
exercising dominion over vast areas of 
the ocean surfaces by virtne of their 
presence. Such increased activity "made 
far more rigorous and oppressive" those 
British assertions over control of neutral 
commerce made in earlier years.22 The 
growing presence of the Royal Navy at 
sea was met by ever more vociferous, 
but generally ineffective, resistance on 
the part of maritime neutrals toward 
interference with their claimed rights to 
trade with any country with which they 
were at peace. 
The turbulence of the age was 
capped by the cataclysmic struggle 
against the French Revolution and 
Napoleon. A passage by Mahan best 
describes the situation as it affected 
neutral states: 
In the effort to bring under the 
yoke of their own policy the 
commerce of the whole world, the 
two chief contestants, France and 
Great Britain, swayed back and 
forth in deadly grapple over the 
vast arena, trampling underfoot 
the rights and interests of the 
weaker parties; who, whether as 
neutrals, or as subjects of friendly 
or allied powers, looked helplessly 
on, and found that in this great 
struggle for self-preservation, 
neither outcries, nor threats, nor 
despairing submission, availed to 
lessen the pressure that was gradu-
ally crushing out both hope and 
life.23 
British practice was especially 
onerous, as she clung to her contention 
that blockades were enforceable by 
far-ranging isolated cruisers, and she 
frequently declared blockades backed 
by just sufficient naval force as to 
permit the barest claim to efficiency. 
But the real basis of neutral complaint 
against England was the belief that the 
British use of the blockade often had 
the aim, not to deprive an enemy of 
goods, but to secure for Englishmen the 
trade thus barred to neutrals. The . 
suspicion appears justified in the light of 
an observation by Lord Grenville in a 
letter of 18 February 1806, in which he 
says: 
We have a right to prevent that 
[trade] which is injurious to us, 
and may, if we think right, in 
cases where we think the advan-
tage to ourselves compensates or 
overbalances the injury; a princi-
ple manifest in the case of a siege, 
where we exclude all the world 
from intercourse with the town 
besieged, but carry it on ourselves, 
whenever we think it beneficial to 
our interests to do SO.24 
In response to this so-called British 
system, "the continental powers began 
to aim only at establishing some rule 
which should prevent ineffe'ctive, and 
therefore ... inequitable, blockades. "25 
These continental powers advocated 
another interpretation of the blockade 
principle which was drawn from their 
own experience as maritime states more 
often cast in the role of neutrals rather 
than belligerents. In their view, block-
ades could only be legitimate "if there 
be manifest danger in entering the 
blockaded port, from the cannon either 
of ships, stationary and sufficiently ncar 
one another, or of works on land.'>2 6 
That is, they claimed that the right of 
the blockading power to interdict non-
contraband neutral commerce derived 
solely from the blockader's ability to 
control the sea immediately off the port 
in the same sense that a besieging army 
could command the land approaches to 
a town.27 , 
Countering this claim, the British 
insisted that the legality of a blockade 
was proven if the blockader could 
"maintain such a force as would be of 
itself sufficient to enforce the block-
ade. ,>2 8 Additionally, Britain refused to 
accept any limitation on the geographic 
placement of the blockading forces or 
of their numbers. The real danger 
needed to make a blockade effective, 
and thus legal, she asserted, could be 
posed by numbers of individual cruising 
warships even at great distances from 
the blockaded coast; and that such 
cruisers, in keeping with the practice of 
Holland in earlier years, could capture 
lawfully even intended violators of the 
blockade. The British position, thus, 
was identical to that of the Dutch at the 
time of the 1630 placaat, and, as the 
Mahan quote above indicates, no power 
or plea could move them from it in the 
face of the threat from France. 
At the same time, however, it was 
realized in Britain that the maritime 
balance of the world had begun to shift 
from European waters, for "a new 
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power had now arisen on the western 
shore of the Atlantic, whose position, 
and maritime spirit, were calculated to 
give new and vast importance to every 
question of neutral rights. '>2 9 The early 
British appreciation of deep American 
interest in affairs concerning maritime 
neutral rights was predicated on the 
announced aims of the newborn Re-
public from the earliest days of inde-
pendence.3o Even the earliest American 
diplomacy attempted to deal with all 
aspects of maritime commercial 
freedom in order to secure for her 
private traders and national good the 
benefits of international commerce, but 
the basic American view of blockade is 
best represented in the instructions 
given to the American Minister in 
London in 1804, which said, in part: 
In order to determine what 
characterizes a blockaded port, 
that denomination is given only 
... where there is by the disposi-
tion of ... ships stationary or suf-
ficiently ncar an evident danger in 
entering.31 
The fictitious blockades pro-
claimed by Great Britain, and 
made the pretext for violating the 
commerce of neutral nations, has 
been one of the greatest abuses 
ever committed on the high 
seas. ... The whole scene was a 
perfect mockery, in which fact 
was sacrificed to form, and right 
to power and plunder.32 
What had been a controversy be-
tween Britain and the continental neu-
trals was now joined by a parallel, but 
independent, controversy between 
Britain and America; yet, British deter-
mination to uphold her position "be-
came a cornerstone of national policy," 
and "was considered of such importance 
in 1812 that ... we considered the dis-
advantages of having the United States 
added to our enemies less than those 
that would follow from a modification 
of our code. "3 3 This intransigence had 
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its expected result when President Madi-
son "made clear that 'mock blockades' 
were one of the principal causes of the 
war" which opened in 1812.34 
Neither the European settlement at 
Vienna in 1815 nor the Treaty of Ghent 
between Britain and the United States 
late in the preceding year resolved the 
issues of neutral rights so hotly con-
tested through the previous 25 years. It 
remained for the next major European 
war to bring about the conditions under 
which some degree of reconciliation 
between the opposing views could be 
attained. In 1854, the perpetual ene-
mies, continental France and insular 
Britain, were allies in the Crimean War 
which opened in that year. If they were 
to be effective in the joint application 
of their seapower, it was recognized that 
some compromise must be struck on 
their policies toward neutral rights at 
sea, and a temporary agreement was 
reached. At the Congress of Paris in 
1856, this compromise was enacted into 
a joint convention among the states 
present and was promulgated as the 
Declaration of Paris, in which all mari-
time powers were invited to join.35 
The Declaration of Paris represented 
the first codification of the rules of 
maritime war which was generally 
accepted among maritime states. The 
Declaration consisted of four points of 
agreement among the powers, of which 
the first abolished privateering, and the 
fourth declared the principle that: 
Blockades, in order to be bind-
ing, must be effective; that is to 
say, maintained by force suf-
ficient really to prevent access to 
the coast of the enemy. 3 6 
Even this enunciation fell far short of 
complete reconciliation of the differ-
ences of the powers, as the language 
apparently was left deliberately obscure 
and ambiguous. Britain remained free to 
interpret "force sufficient really to pre-
vent access" as she might see her inter-
ests at the moment. In retrospect, it is 
clear that the Declaration simply 
codified the pragmatic essence of recent 
experience, and is significant less for its 
content than for the fact that any 
agreement was possible among the self-
seeking states which authored it. It is 
significant to point out that it was 
historic British policy and seapower 
after 1689 which essentially fixed both 
the form and scope of the Declaration, 
since the principles set forward either 
conformed directly with those policies 
or were generated by the erosion of 
certain facets of them by decades of 
neutral resistance. 
The broad theoretical claims of Brit-
ish blockade policy over those years 
were given meaning and effect by Brit-
ish seamen. However, the reality of 
British principle is summed up by the 
remarks of one Member of Parliament, 
who, after acknowledging insular Brit-
ain's dependence on imported food and 
exported manufactures, goes on to say: 
These considerations have 
always led us, practically,' to vio-
late our own theory of a com-
mercial blockade, whenever the 
power to do so has remained in 
our hands .... It is true we have 
maintained, for our navy, the tra-
ditional right and duty of a block-
ade, whilst (I beg your attention 
to the distinction) we have in-
variably connived at its evasion.3 7 
III-AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON 
THE LAW: CONTINUOUS VOYAGE 
Although American influence on the 
Declaration of Paris was negligible, the 
maturing of her sea strength and the 
necessities of the American Civil War 
which broke out in 1861 were to leave a 
distinct American influence on the 
further evolution of the recognized prin-
ciples of blockade. During that conflict, 
American courts were to apply a prin-
ciple to blockade which had once been 
purely a colonial policy of the European 
mercantilist states, i.e., the Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyage.3 8 
Shortly before the outbreak of the 
insurrection, the United States position 
with respect to the law of blockade was 
summarized in the instructions of the 
American Secretary ,of State to Ameri-
can Ministers abroad. The position 
taken reverted to the archaic view of the 
blockade as an extension to seaward of 
investing forces around localized mili-
tary strongpoints. In the words of the 
Secretary: 
The investment of a place by 
sea and land with a view to its 
reduction ... is a legitimate mode 
of prosecuting hostilities .... But 
the blockade of a coast, or of 
commercial positions along it, 
without any regard to ulterior 
military operations, and with the 
real design of carrying on a war 
against trade ... is a proceeding 
which is difficult to reconcile with 
reason or with the opinions of 
modern times. To watch every 
creek, and river, and harbour 
upon an ocean frontier, in order 
to seize and confiscate every ves-
sel ... attempting to enter or go 
out, without any direct effect 
upon the true objects of war, is a 
mode of conducting hostilities 
which would find few advocates if 
now first presented for considera-
tion.39 
This interpretation was one not only 
substantially out of step with the dis-
tilled theory of the previous centuries 
but one directly contrary to that 
adoptcd by the Federal forces in 186l. 
It is instructive only as one additional 
example of the readiness of states in the 
international community to lay what-
ever interpretation on ambiguous as-
pects of the law of nations as best serves 
their instant interests. In 1859, Cass was 
expressing an interpretation that would 
favor the commercial interests of the 
United States in any contest of major 
European naval powers; it represents 
merely a diplomatic gambit to compen-
satc for America's weak naval strength 
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as opposed' to the European states. In 
1861, however, the Federal Government 
found itself at war with a group of 
southern states whose maritime poten-
tial was miniscule compared to that of 
the North, and consequently we find 
the North quickly attempting to occupy 
the same "high ground" so firmly held 
by Great Britain vis-a-vis the United 
States. Once more, principle yielded to 
political reality. 
President Lincoln acted within a 
week of the fall of Fort Sumter to 
proclaim on 19 April 1861, that the 
ports of the rebellious states from South 
Carolina to Texas were blockaded "in 
pursuance of the laws of the United 
States and the law of nations," later 
extending the blockade to the states of 
Virginia and North Carolina as their 
rebel status became apparent.40 
Although the United States had re-
fused to accede to the recent Declara-
tion of Paris,4 i the question of effec-
tiveness of the blockade was immedi-
ately a point of controversy, as the 
United States had long championed the 
principle of "effectiveness" as a deter-
minant of legality. One historian has 
noted that in April 1861 the Federal 
Navy possessed only 35 modern vessels, 
and that only three steam-propelled 
vessels were immediately available for 
blockade duty.42 Another points out 
that the length of the shoreline to be 
interdicted by this force was in excess 
of 3,500 miles, from Washington down 
the Potomac around to the mouth of 
the Rio Grande, and that it included 
189 river mouths and harbors.43 
It is easy to visualize the mixture of 
skepticism and outrage with which Brit-
ain and the other European maritime 
powers greeted the pretensions of the 
Federal Government! Truly, "an effec-
tive blockade on such a scale was a thing 
unprecedented, even in the operations 
of the foremost naval powers in the 
world. ,>44 
Nevertheless, the normal seaborne 
trade of the southern states declined 
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immediately after the proclamation of 
blockade, partly because some neutrals 
acceded to it voluntarily and took their 
trade elsewhere, but more likely because 
of the normal dislocation of trade ac-
companying a shift from a peacetime to 
a wartime economy.45 This reduction 
of trade and its effect on the price of 
cotton in Europe lent credence to the 
Federal claim to effectiveness of their 
skeletal sea forces in the early months 
of the blockade.46 
Soon, however, the weakness of the 
Federal force, combined with the grow-
ing demand in the South for the import 
of the sinews of war, encouraged the 
development of enlarged trade efforts in 
defiance of the blockade. Since under 
Anglo-American policies the liability to 
capture began for the blockade runner 
at the moment of departure on the 
illegal voyage, enterprising shippers 
sought to shorten this exposure to a 
minimum. The several neutral ports 
which closely surrounded the blockaded 
area, such as Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, 
etc., soon became entrepots for the 
transshipment of goods bound in and 
out of the South. The arrangement 
facilitated specialization of shipping 
used in the trade, with fast, shallow-
draft steamers used for the two- or 
three-day run in and out of the block-
aded ports, and large slow, and stout 
vessels used for the long ocean crossing 
to Europe.4 7 
The Federal authorities now looked 
to the mercantilist Doctrine of Continu-
ous Voyage as justification for the 
arresting of this trade. Union cruisers 
operated far offshore to back up the 
forces available for close-in observation 
of southern ports, and deliberately 
positioned themselves to intercept 
oceangoing traffic bound from Europe 
to the various neutral ports off the 
southern coast. They soon began to 
bring in for adjudication under prize law 
a number of neutral vessels, mostly 
British, which appeared from their 
cargoes and documents to be enroute to 
such ports. In the first announced deci-
sion, which was not appealed by the 
British owners, ship and cargo were 
condemned for attempting violation of 
the blockade. The U.S. District Court 
held that: 
The cutting up of a continuous 
voyage into several parts ... can-
not make a voyage which in its 
nature is one to become two or 
more voyages, nor make any of 
one entire voyage to become legal 
which would be illegal if not so 
divided.48 
A better-known case, that of the Ber-
muda, which was finally decided in 
1865, is even more definitive of the 
Doctrine as applied by the American 
Courts. Intercepted on a voyage be-
tween Bermuda and Nassau, both neu-
tral ports, the Bermuda and her cargo 
were condemned by the District Court 
for attempted blockade running. On 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
decision was confirmed, because, in the 
words of the Court: 
Successive voyages, connected 
by a common plan and a common 
object, form a plural unit. They 
are links in the same chain, each 
identical in description with every 
other, and each essential to the 
continuous whole. The ships are 
planks of the same bridge, all of 
the same kind, and all necessary 
to the convenient passage of per-
sons and property from one end 
to the other.4 'l1 
The most celebrated case of the war was 
that of the Springbok, which had been 
captured enroute from London to Mata-
moros, Mexico, a port adjacent to the 
Rebel port of Brownsville, Texas. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the condemnation of the cargo only, 
saying: 
That the voyage ... was as to 
cargo, both in law and in the 
intent of the parties, one voyage; 
and that the liability to con-
demnation ... attached to the 
cargo from the time of 
sailing.50 
Two significant aspects of the Spring-
bok case are worth noting. First, the 
initial condemnation had been based on 
evidence adduced from two other cases 
then in the process of being tried.51 
This violated the traditional principle 
that condemnation must derive solely 
on evidence adduced from the ship's 
papers or the responses of her officers 
or crew to interrogation. Secondly, the 
British Government openly approved 
the decision in its rejection of the 
request of the British owners for an 
expression of protest, by saying: 
Having regard to the very 
doubtful character of all trade 
ostensibly carried on at Nassau, 
and to many other circumstances 
of suspicion before the Court, Her 
Majesty's Government are not dis-
posed to consider the argument of 
the court on this point as other-
wise than tenable.5 2 
Some observers53 viewed the absence of 
British protest as reflecting a sinister 
intent to let the method and decision 
stand as a precedent upon which to base 
future British actions, as in fact they did 
during World War 1. 
In the extension of the Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyage to blockade, the 
Amcrican courts had moved into an 
area without exact precedent; even in 
the colonial confiscations, no ship or 
cargo had been condemned during the 
first stage of an illegal voyage. Under-
standably, international jurists 
expressed general disapproval, and over 
the next several decades dozens of 
criticisms of the American action were 
delivered within the international law 
community. This wave of disapproval 
culminated in an expression by the 
maritime prize committee of the In-
stitute of International Law in 1882 
that such a doctrine, if allowed to 
stand, would "annihilate" neutral trade 
on the mere "suspicion that the car-
go . .. may be transshipped ... and 
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carried to some effectively hlockaded 
port. "54 
The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage 
was not a uniquely American contribu-
tion to the developing law, being 
founded in earlier British colonial prac-
tice, but its application to blockade hy 
American courts opened the Pandora's 
box which had long served to contain in 
large measure the most volatile issues of 
neutral rights. By this action, the United 
States unwittingly contributed to the 
growing demand of all maritime powers 
for some consensual formulation of the 
law of maritime warfare, a demand 
which was realized shortly after the 
opening of the new century at the 
London Conference of 1908-1909. At 
that conference, the confused interpre-
tations of centuries of experience would 
be clarified in a code of maritime 
warfare known as the Declaration of 
London-a code which even now in the 
1960's stands as the only· accepted 




OF LONDON, 1909 
The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, 
at the suggestion of both the British and 
German delegates, adopted a Convention 
for the establishment of an International 
Prize Court as a court of appeal from the 
national prize courts which alone had 
traditionally evaluated the lawfulness of 
captures made at sea in time of war. 
Before such a court could function, 
however, it was necessary for all maritime 
powers to agree on the standards of 
maritime warfare which the Court would 
be required to enforce. Accordingly, 
Great Britain suggested that a conference 
of such states be assembled in London in 
late 1908 to formulate "rules which, in 
the absence of special treaty provisions 
applicable to a particular case, the Court 
should observe in dealing with appeals 
brought before it. "5 5 
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Such a conference did convene in 
November 1908, and proceeded to 
devise a code of maritime warfare which 
was generally acceptable to the repre-
sentatives of the maritime community. 
It was issued in February 1909 as the 
Declaration of London. 
The Declaration was the first, and 
only, exhaustive compilation of all the 
aspects of maritime warfare which had 
for so long divided the maritime powers 
of the world. Even though the Declara-
tion ultimately failed to be incorporated 
formally into the law of nations, it 
remains even today as the basis for the 
current international law on blockade, 
contraband, and neutral maritime rights. 
The Declaration treated the matters 
of blockade and contraband quite ex-
tensively, devoting 44 of its 71- Articles 
to those topics. In brief, it confirmed 
the 1856 pronouncement of effective-
ness as the test for legality of blockade 
and, contrary to the wishes of the 
United States,S 6 forbade the applica-
tion of the Doctrine of Continuous 
Voyage to blockades, reserving it for use 
only against absolute contraband.57 
Further, the Declaration forbade inter-
ference by blockading forces with access 
to neutral coasts or ports, a point much 
sought after by the northern European 
neutrals. 58 
When the Conference adjourned on 
26 February 1909, the delegates re-
turned home feeling that they had 
contributed to a great stride forward in 
the regularization of international 
affairs. However, despite Britain's role 
as sponsor, the publication of the Decla-
ration while pending ratification 
brought great opposition by many 
Britons who saw it as an abdication of 
British power.5 9 When the House of 
Lords failed to enact a bill in support of 
the International Prize Court in 1911, 
the Declaration was effectively rejected. 
Since Britain had failed to take the 
initiative in ratifying the Declaration, 
the remaining powers saw the futility of 
attempting to consider it as a viable 
segment of the law of nations, and the 
Declaration began to gather dust on the 
shelves of law libraries throughout the 
world. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration did 
exist as the most recent consensus of 
the law of maritime war when World 
War I broke out in 1914. Further, since 
British representatives had contributed 
to its construction and had endorsed its 
provisions at the close of the Con-
ference, the maritime powers of the 
world looked on the defunct Declara-
tion as "not merely a codification of 
law," but as a "declaration of British 
maritime policy. ,,60 
Although this appraisal may have 
been accurate under the conditions 
existing in 1909, it appears that when 
faced with the actuality of war with the 
Central Powers in 1914, Britain realized 
that a blanket acceptance of the Dec-
laration would be inimical to her na-
tional interest. Consequently, she an-
nounced on 20 August 1914, that the 
Declaration would be the general basis 
of her maritime policy during the war 
but "with certain modifications. '061 
These modifications ultimately rendered 
impotent the most significant advances 
made under the Declaration, from the 
point of view of the neutral maritime 
states. By 1918, the terms of the Dec-
laration aimed at protecting neutral 
rights had been honored more by their 
breach than their observance. With 
respect to the detailed principles of the 
law of blockade so extensively set out in 
the Declaration, Britain avoided their 
restrictions simply by not declaring a 
formal blockade. The rationale was 
quite pragmatic, although not expressed 
openly until long after the war. From 
the British view, 
A formal declaration of block-
ade was deemed inadvisable for 
strategic and legal reasons; naval 
experts realized that we could not 
operate successfully in the Baltic 
with any continuity.... More-
over, the Baltic is only one of the 
commercial gates into Germany, 
and much of her trade arrives via 
Rotterdam .... Thus, it would be 
wiser not to announce the word 
"blockade. ,062 
The prewar views of at least one 
British naval authority had recognized 
before 1911 that the realities of modem 
war had outstripped the detailed legal-
isms of the Declaration. After noting 
the practical impossibility of maintain-
ing a close blockade against a continen-
tal enemy in the face of submarines, 
torpedo boats, and mines, this prescient 
naval officer went on to assert that the 
doctrine of blockade had become 
merged within a larger doctrine dictated 
by 20th century necessity-that of total 
economic war. Pointing out the particu-
lar sensitivity of both Britain and Ger-
many to attack through their com-
merce, he went on to outline proposed 
British actions in the event of a war 
with Germany on the assumption that 
the terms of the London Declaration 
could be ignored or avoided. He 
advised: 
In that case, our obvious 
course, to be adopted as soon as 
the naval situation permitted, 
would be to declare a blockade of 
the North Sea ports, and simul-
taneously to make a sweeping 
declaration of what was contra-
band, including all the principal 
raw materials .... Neutral vessels. 
would be rigorously held up and 
cxamined ... the doctrine of con-
tinuous voy~e would be rigor-
ously applied. 3 
The British actions after 1914 closely 
paralleled this program with all manner 
of additional devices employed in the 
effort to completely cut off all German 
sea commerce. These activities greatly 
antagonized the neutral trading powers 
but ultimately resulted in the total 
disruption of German economic 
strength and starvation for her popula-
tion. Despite an intention early in the 
war to remain within the generally 
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accepted rules of the Declaration, by 
1915 the effects of new technology had 
begun to be exerted, and both Germany 
and Britain embarked on open and 
unrestricted economic war against the 
other's commerce. It might be suggested 
that the only principle of international 
law which was strictly observed 
throughout the war was that of neces-
sity, whereunder all manner of hereto-
fore reprehensible actions could at least 
be rationalized. 
The enactment of the Declaration, its 
failure of ratification, and its ultimate 
rejection under the stress of modem 
technology are all significant to this 
study, but it seems specious to berate 
the obvious direct contribution of these 
events to the thesis of this paper. It 
seems more profitable to point out 
some of the less obvious lessons to be 
drawn from this experience. 
The code of maritime war hammered 
out by the delegates to London in 
1908-1909 has made a contribution to 
the developing law of nations. It is 
instructive primarily as a codification of 
historical experience, and also as ex-
ample of the considerable risk inherent 
in the enshrinement of precedent with-
out regard either to the special circum-
stances of its creation or the immediate 
realities of existing· technology and 
politics. 
V-CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW 
The evolutionary process described 
in earlier chapters has remained essen-
tially at a standstill since the abortive 
London Declaration of 1909. Despite 
the failure of the Declaration to be 
formally adopted by the international 
community, and despite the almost uni-
versal rejection of its key principles 
during the major wars of this century, 
the terms of the Declaration are yet 
considered to be an acceptable expres-
sion of the developed law of maritime 
warfare. This paradox is explained by 
the customary practice of the inter-
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national legal profession of regarding all 
such consensual agreements among 
states as contributory to the formation 
of law. In its view, the Declaration itself 
is meaningless as a matter of law; but it 
is significant still because it represents 
the then-current views of the interna-
tional community and, thus, can be 
used as a standard against which to 
compare state practices since that time. 
Thus, it is common to find heavy 
reliance placed by jurists and publicists 
on the terms of the Declaration in their 
extensive writings on the subject of 
maritime warfare. 
There are, therefore, some number of 
fundamental characteristics which a 
given instance of blockade must display 
if it is to avoid condemnation by the 
international jurist and thus command 
the respect and cooperation of the 
community of nations which inhabit the 
modern world. These characteristics are 
derived from the terms of the entire 
developed body of the law, including 
the London Declaration which so con-
veniently reflects previous experience. It 
will be meaningful, then, to review 
those characteristics given the greatest 
significance by those two bodies of 
organized opinion: First, in order to 
complete the summary of the evolu-
tionary process begun in the 17th cen-
tury; and second, to permit a critical 
analysis of the continued validity of 
such criteria in the world of today. 
The first principle generally applied 
is that the right to blockade is one 
deriving only to a belligerent power, 
solely as a function of the existence of 
that state of belligerency.64 Modern 
publicists do recognize a similar institu-
tion under a condition short of bellig-
erency known as pacific blockade, but 
generally dismiss this device of the 19th 
century as outmoded65 and in any 
event not subject to the principles of 
commercial blockade under discussion. 
Secondly, the acknowledged princi-
ple of the Declaration of Paris regarding 
effectiveness is regarded as crucial to 
establishing the legal sufficiency of a 
blockade since this element requires the 
application of actual naval power to 
enforce the blockade, and is the only 
principle truly accepted as a part of the 
law of nations on the subject of block-
ade.66 
Further conditions must be satisfied, 
and they are- again usually found to have 
been expressed in the London Declara-
tion. Among them is the requirement 
that blockades must be confined to the 
coasts or ports of the enemy and that 
access to neutral ports may not be 
restricted.67 A natural corollary to this 
requirement is the principle that cap-
tures may not be made if, at the 
moment of interception, the neutral 
vessel is enroute to a neutral port.6 8 
This, of course, prevents the application 
of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage 
to blockades and constitutes a rejection 
by the international law community of 
American practice during the Civil War. 
The issue of when a vessel becomes 
liable to condemnation for breach of 
blockade was left obscure by the Lon-
don Declaration, which merely men-
tions the possibility of condemnation if 
"at the time of shipment of the goods" 
the shipper could be presumed or 
proven to have knowledge of intent to 
break the blockade.69 However, it 
appears that at least Anglo-American 
jurists would support the practice 
whereunder liability would commence 
at the instant of departure for a block-
aded port. Such a position appears to 
have been supported by American prac-
tice in 1917.70 
In addition to imposing restrictive 
conditions on the blockading state, cur-
rent law as expressed by the publicists 
continues to reward it by acknowledg-
ing its right to stop completely all sea 
traffic enroute to or from the enemy. 71 
In the view of the international law 
community, no state has the right to 
seize or delay commerce on the high 
seas except under specific conditions 
associated with belligerent and neutral 
status; it is, therefore, asserted by them 
that the advantages to be secured by a 
state only under the precise conditions 
associated with the developed law of 
blockade are sufficient to warrant the 
insistence that states comply completely 
with these conditions when exerting 
naval power against commerce at sea. 
It appears, however, that there are 
some fatal flaws in this argument, some 
of which are traceable to faults in the 
source of modem law and others arising 
purely from the modem status of inter-
national law itself. 
First, it is clear that the technical 
conditions of the modem law of block-
ade are derived from the experience of 
maritime states since the 17th century, 
and that these conditions are the 
progeny of similar terms expressed in 
the Declaration of London. But, if the 
Declaration itself could have been re-
garded within only a few years of its 
formulation as "merely a body of rules 
for regulating naval operations against 
commercial systems that had dis-
appeared, "72 is it not valid to suspect 
that a modernized form of that code is 
equally contaminated by that charge of 
anachronism? In short, does the view 
of blockade expressed by modem 
writers agree with the realities of the 
social and economic system which it 
seeks to regulate as sound international 
law must do,73 or is it so far out of step 
with the reality that it needs to "be set 
to true time"? 
VI-BLOCKADE IN THE 
COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT 
It has been shown that the developed 
law of blockade has evolved parallel to 
and coordinate with that body of rules 
generally referred to as international law 
or the law of nations. The general 
subject, international law, is one of 
enormous scope and importance in the 
modem world. However, it is also one 
of broad controversy, imprecise both in 
acceptance and application-a thicket 
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into which a . layman may proceed only 
with great caution after accepting the 
sure knowledge that at least as many 
authorities in the field will disagree with 
him as may be inclined to agree with his 
views. However, it is necessary to at 
least express some general views about 
the institution in order to analyze the 
position in its context of the modem 
law of blockade. 
First, international law must be a 
tool of world society to be applied in 
regulating the political and economic 
affairs among the member states of that 
society. Historically, the applications of 
this tool have met with varying degrees 
of success and cooperation. Generally, 
the greatest success has occurred in 
applications to matters of obvious 
benefit to all states, such as in the 
establishment of rules for the preven-
tion of collisions at sea and the prin-
ciples governing the exchange of diplo-
matic and consular agents. Further, it 
appears that international law has 
shown the ability to grow in usefulness 
with the passage of time. Those of a 
legalistic tum of mind might suggest 
that this growing utility arises primarily 
from the parallel growth of custom and 
precedent, touching on an ever-wider 
scope of matters of interest to state 
relations. It seems more believable, 
though, to attribute the growing influ-
ence of the law to the increased recogni-
tion by states of the necessity for 
members of international society to get 
along with one another in their mutual 
self-interest. Additionally, it appears 
that this recognition of mutual interest 
is directly attributable to the enlarged 
economic and social interdependence of 
the states within the community. 
However, it may be that the law has 
become more effective, and, whatever 
theories one might wish to credit with 
the responsibility for improved per-
formance, it remains clear only that 
such a body of "law" exists, and that it 
is respected and obeyed by states in 
varying degrees. If it is necessary to 
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correlate this variable acceptance with 
some factor, it readily appears that, at 
least in the past, obedience and respect 
for the law has generally been a func-
tion of state power and the interpreta-
tion of national interest. It must be 
admitted that this situation seems rea-
sonable to the individual observer in the 
light of his own experience with his 
fellowmen. 
This last generalization, at least, 
would seem to be borne out by some 
members of the juristic community who 
have considered the revised status of the 
law of nations in the environment of the 
world of the Iron Curtain and the cold 
war. Regarding the historic evolution of 
the law of nations itself, one author 
states that "international legal norms 
underwent constant reinterpretation 
and development-generally keeping in 
step with the evolving needs and policies 
of the stronger states. "74 Another, 
addressing himself more directly to the 
polarized nature of modern world 
politics, observes that "a realistic analy-
sis of the limited scope for international 
law in East-West relations implies that 
ultimately, these relations are not 
governed by law, but by power. "75 The 
most chilling confirmation of the ob-
server's assumption of a "power and 
self-interest" theory to explain the 
applicability of law in the modern con-
text is provided by the words of a 
Soviet jurist, who said in 1948: 
Those institutions in interna-
tional law which can facilitate the 
execution of the stated tasks of 
the USSR are recognized and 
applied by the USSR, and those 
institutions which conflict in any 
manner with these purposes are 
rejected by the USSR.7 6 
How then should the law of blockade 
be regarded in an era characterized by 
such apostasy toward an institution 
which once was viewed with almost the 
same blind faith accorded religion? If 
the law of blockade be a part of the law 
of nations, and if that law of nations 
can be expected to command the ad-
herence of states only so long as those 
states remain convinced of the self-
advantage of such adherence, it would 
seem that the law of blockade may be 
regarded as binding only insofar as its 
tenets reflect the reality of modern 
politics and economics. Wherever the 
developed law of blockade can be 
shown to rest on precedent no longer 
valid in modern society, it should be 
adhered to only if such adherence is in 
the national interest. Preferably, such 
aspects of the law should he rejected, 
and newer and more timely principles 
should be enunciated in order to bring 
that doctrine to a more logical maturity. 
In keeping with this view, let us 
evaluate the elements of the law of 
blockade as it seems to exist in the eyes 
of modern writers and jurists and see if 
it, in fact, conforms to the social order 
which it is intended to serve. 
First, it is contended that the right to 
blockade is a belligerent right only; that 
is, one which may be exercised only by 
a nation in an acknowledged state of 
war with another. The essence of the 
point is that legality (i.e., general 
approval by the states of society) can 
attach only to a blockade proclaimed as 
an act of war. However, there now 
appears to be some doubt that any act 
of war can be regarded as "legal" 
because of the direction taken by the 
body of international law after World 
Wars I and II. Beginning with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations after 
World War 1,77 progressin~ through the 
Pact of Paris in 1928, 8 and cul-
minating in the Charter of the United 
Nations signed in 1945,79 the interna-
tional community steadily progressed 
toward the official banishment of war as 
an acceptable "legal" means of solving 
international differences. 
At least one authority considers that 
the ancient right of states to make war 
in the "traditional sense is definitely 
ruled out" under the Charter of the 
United Nations since the use of force 
for the settling of disputes is reserved to 
the Security Council by that agree-
ment. SO Thus, in a strict sense, no 
degree of legality can be attached to any 
violent act, excepting only acts taken in 
self-defense. 
However accurate this interpretation 
may be, additional grounds seem to 
exist for claiming legality for a blockade 
not declared as an act of war under the 
sanction of belligerent right. The status 
of belligerence exists under law simply 
as a means of describing the condition 
of states not at peace. That is, it appears 
to be based on the inability of the early 
jurists or publicists to conceive of states 
existing in a condition other than that 
of war or its opposite, peace. There is, 
however, some evidence indicating the 
rccognition by a measurable segment of 
opinion of a third status, beyond that of 
peace yet short of war. For example, as 
early as 1907 the English jurist Westlake 
considered that such a condition could 
exist, observing that "~cts of force are 
not war unless either a government does 
them with the intent of war or the 
government against which they are done 
clects to treat them as war. ,>81 A more 
recent publicist expressed the idea more 
concretely by stating that "there may 
be ... a state of 'intermediacy' between 
peace and war ... characterized 
by ... hostility between the opposing 
parties ... but accompanied by an 
absence of intention or decision to go to 
war. "S 2 In a comprehensive discussion 
of the matter, another eminent au-
thority conceded the significant advan-
tage of recognizing such a sta~s of 
intermediacy to be that it could be 
endowed with "legal consequences" 
similar in force and effect to the two 
traditional conditions. S 3 In the view of 
another author, such legal consequences 
might "include limited restrictions on 
the freedom of the seas hitherto recog-
nized only in war but falling short of 
full scale blockade.'>84 It is clear from 
these observations that such a state of 
intermediacy could exist only where the 
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parties to the dispute were unable to 
resolve it within the purely peaceful 
means now available under modern 
international law yet were unwilling to 
extend the tension to a complete war 
status. Is it not equally plain that many 
such situations can and will occur as a 
result of the Soviet-American contest 
for world leadership? Further, in view 
of the great expansion of the Soviet 
merchant marine in the last decades5 
and the expressed intention of the 
Soviets to support "wars of national 
liberation" wherever occurring, is it not 
probable that confrontations at sea will 
become commonplace in the future 
between the naval forces of the West 
and Soviet seapower? Already the 
Cuban "quarantine" crisis of 1962 
appears in retrospect as an obvious 
example of a condition of intermediacy. 
Because the status of that time had not 
been widely enunciated, the condition 
was not so easily recognized, nor even 
now has it been generally accepted as a 
principle. Yet, it would ~eem that such a 
status must ultimately be recognized, as 
so many others have been in the past, 
because of the reality of political and 
economic circumstances now abroad in 
the international community. 
Another characteristic of the law of 
blockade which might be open to ques-
tion in the light of modern experience is 
that provision forbidding interference 
with free access to neutral ports. In 
discussing this provision, it might first 
be observed that it, above all others, 
seems to have been honored more in the 
breach than in the observance almost 
from the day of its formulation in 1909. 
In World War I all pretense of com-
pliance with this principle was dropped 
after early 1915 by Great Britain.s6 
The reality of her position on the 
subject was expressed at a later date in 
terms of clearly recognizing the 
dominance of self-interest over princi-
ple. At that time one authority stated: 
... the extent of a belligerent's 
right to interfere with seaborne 
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commerce is conditioned by the 
extent of his command of the sea, 
and that the real principle under-
lying the idea of blockade is the 
right of a belligerent to deny to _ 
the commerce of his enemy the 
use of areas of sea which he is in a 
position effectively to control. 8 7 
Associated with the dictum that 
blockading forces may not interfere 
with traffic enroute to and from neutral 
ports is the requirement that no vessel 
may be seized for breach of blockade if 
she is first encountered on her way to a 
neutral port. That is, the Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyage may not be applied 
to blockade.8 8 A cursory review of 
world history since 1914 would reveal 
that the practice of states at war during 
that period has been quite directly the 
opposite from that intended by both 
these requirements. In both world wars 
tlle commerce of neutrals and bellig-
erents alike was attacked mercilessly 
with all of the means available to the 
contesting powers. There does not seem 
to be any reason to suspect that such 
rules would be observed by the parties 
to any future contest between the major 
antagonists now dominating world 
politics. 
In point of fact, it seems ludicrous to 
contemplate the possibility of any 
meaningful observance of the "legal" 
code of blockade in the current or 
predictable future state of political 
reality. It is clear that the rules of 
blockade came into existence solely to 
protect the ordinary sea commerce of 
neutrals and to regulate the circum-
stances under which such trade could be 
interrupted. The rules derive out of a 
19th century legal regime-a regime 
oriented toward regulating the conduct 
of states in war and peace.8 9 But 
modern international law, of which 
blockade is a part, no longer seeks to 
regulate war but to prevent its occur-
rence. The formation of a world organi-
zation dedicated to this end has effec-
tively ended the issue of neutral rights 
at sea in war by outlawing war and by 
the implied denial of the status of 
neutrality in the face of armed conflict 
by any member of the organization. If 
neutrality as a legal subsystem in inter-
national law is inconsistent with the 
collective security ~stem of the United 
Nations as alleged,9 then observance of 
rules created as part of that subsystem 
have at least become optional if not 
completely unnecessary. Certainly, in 
view of the expressed intent of the 
Soviet Union to observe only those 
portions of the law of nations which are 
consistent with its wishes, it would be 
wise for other states to reserve to 
themselves the degree of observance to 




Under the simplified circumstances 
of antiquity, combatants recognized the 
necessity of depriving the enemy of 
supplies and reinforcements essential to 
his continued resistance. As society 
grew more complex and economically 
more interdependent, the realities of 
international politics dictated that some 
concession be made to nonparticipants 
to retain the support their supplies 
would provide for warlike operations by 
both sides. Such concessions led to the 
concept of neutrality and ultimately 
became thoroughly circumscribed with 
technical conditions under which neu-
trals might continue trade with any 
belligerent they could reach. But the 
continuing evolution of international 
society resulted in widening the scope 
of wartime operations, as individual 
states accrued great military power, 
they acquired the ability to destroy 
completely the social and economic 
fabric of their enemies, and war had 
become a matter of national survival by 
the beginning of the 19th century. 
Under these classic rules of neu-
trality, the right to blockade an enemy 
was a valued tool of the belligerent, for 
only by complying with certain 
accepted principles associated with the 
institution could he deprive his enemy 
of commerce with the general acquies-
cence of the world society. However, as 
war became more total, the once simple 
rules of blockade became more and 
more complex until the technicalities 
imposed in the name of neutral rights 
obscured the fundamental purpose of 
the institution itself-to cut off an 
enemy's commerce and thus weaken or 
starve him to the point of submission. 
As the law grew out of touch with· the 
realities of power and politics, states 
which had the naval strength and the 
national will to survive began to ignore, 
corrupt, or circumvent the principles so 
carefully constructed by the scholars 
and legalists. The determining factors of 
compliance with the laws became those 
of self-interest and naval power-
tempered only by the ability of a state 
to recognize its own long-term self-
interest Principle yielded to power and 
necessity, and the emergence of the 
20th century concept of total war 
sounded the tocsin for any carefully 
drawn rule which conflicted with the 
necessities of such conflict 
The body of international law which 
exists today represents the result of 
forces generated by conflict of the 
international state system since the 17th 
century. It grew in an environment of 
constant change, but the rate of such 
change remained fairly slow until recent 
decades. Many of its precepts are rooted 
in economic, social, and political ex-
periences of the last century-and the 
law of blockade is peculiarly representa-
tive of this fault 
Speaking of international law in 
general, one writer has said: 
To the majority of the writers 
and exponents of international 
law, contemporary changes appear 
as extensions and modifications 
rather than as basic challenges to 
the structure of international law 
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and relations. It is submitted that 
the extent of the structural 
changes in international relations 
in our time requires a far more 
basic reorientation in our thinking 
in international law. 91 
Such a basic reorientation is neces-
sary at this time with regard to the law 
of blockade. If the historic status of 
"neutrality" can be regarded by some 
authorities as extinct, why cannot a new 
status supersede it? If armed confronta-
tions between East and West are 
accepted by the international com-
munity as being something other than 
"war" in the traditional sense solely 
because the contestants have no inten-
tion to engage in war, then some status 
under law should be accorded to the 
condition. Within such a new category 
of law arising from the circumstances of 
the society it is intended to serve, there 
would be a place for a new code of 
maritime war-a code which would re-
flect 20th century conditions rather 
than the outmoded precedents set in an 
era which could not even conceive of a 
totally bipolarized world. It appears to 
be manifestly clear that such a code 
would contain rules for the conduct of 
operations against commerce at sea. 
Whether such actions be called block.ade 
or "quarantine," commerce warfare will 
always remain as a tool of seapower, 
and a workable code for its conduct 
could only benefit all of world society. 
We are in an era of "limited war" 
because the realities of "total war" in 
the nuclear age are too grotesque to 
consider as real possibilities. The one 
characteristic of the 1962 Cuban "quar-
antine" which drew general approval 
from the world community of nations 
was its controlled and limited nature.92 
And one view expressed with regard to 
the selection of the quarantine method 
in response to the Soviet challenge of 
that autumn remains valid today. Dis-
cussing the President's reasoning on the 
selection of this action, Theodore 
Sorensen has said of the operation: 
190 
Whatever the balance of stra-
tegic and ground forces may have 
been, the superiority of the 
American Navy was unquestioned; 
and. this superiority was world-
wide, should Soviet submarines 
retaliate elsewhere.9 3 
What is proposed herein is simply 
that some form of sea operations against 
Commerce be sanctioned despite the 
absence of a traditional condition of 
belligerency. If ever a traditional war 
erupts between the major antagonists of 
the modern world scene, the issue of 
neutral rights at sea will be academic 
even for the survivors. Some form of 
conflict seems to be a reasonable ex-
pectation in the future as it even now 
exists in Southeast Asia, and, therefore, 
some provision should be made by the 
international community to regulate the 
application of seapower in such con-
flicts. 
The most vociferous retort to this 
proposal may very well be based on its 
apparent suggestion that America 
abandon its traditional advocacy of 
"freedom of the seas," and so some 
brief observations are appropriate on 
that subject. 
Freedom of the seas, in the classic 
Wilsonian sense, means those rights 
which we believe have accrued to all 
states as a result of British policing of 
the oceans in the decades since Trafal-
gar. The basic concept of freedom of 
the seas presupposes the dominance of a 
naval power so disposed as to make such 
freedom possible for itself and others. 
That Great Britain was such a power is 
borne out by study of naval history. As 
Bell remarks, "Great Britain was recog-
nized to have protected the usages and 
customs of Europe [and consequently 
all of Western society] by her un-
flinching resistance to the Napoleonic 
empire. "94 Now, with Britain eclipsed 
by modern U.S. naval power, the bur-
den of protecting, exploiting, or re-
futing those rights associated with the 
concept of "freedom of the seas" lies 
with the United States under the same 
grounds that they once devolved upon 
Britain. It is clearly the duty of such 
power to be exercised in defense of the 
concept when threatened by a power 
which might not act to preserve such 
freedom, but to hamper or destroy it. 
All states have recognized the need to 
accept restrictions on the usual freedom 
to use the sea when war has broken out 
between maritime states.9S Such restric-
tions imposed in times of nominal peace 
would undoubtedly generate widespread 
outcry by the maritime states of the 
world, but historic experience indicates 
that under the pressing circumstances 
now at issue-for example, in Vietnam-
such a move by the United States would 
not long be opposed by states having a 
sincere interest in preserving the 
freedom which we have long cham-
pioned at sea. 
It is, therefore, proposed that the 
United States take the initiative in 
forcing the modification of the tradi-
tional laws associated with the institu-
tion of blockade: First, by a unilateral 
statement that the existing doctrine is 
inconsistent with the needs of modern 
society; and, second, by propOSing ap-
propriate modifications to the doctrine. 
Such action should be followed by the 
announcement of a n~val "quarantine" 
of the port of Haiphong in North 
Vietnam, including the application of 
the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to 
designated contraband at least to the 
British Crown Colony port of Hong 
Kong, where it has been observed that 
much of the Haiphong commerce "origi-
nates. '>9 6 Such action could be tied in 
with the recent and continuing efforts 
of the United States to secure peace in 
that area by: (1) announcing the naval 
quarantine to be a more humane sub-
stitute for the aerial bombing campaign 
recently resumed; and (2) calling upon 
all states who have expressed dis-
approval of the bombing action to join 
with the United States in carrying out 
the quarantine operation. 
One precedent of the historical law 
of maritime warfare seems most applic-
able even today, and that is the argu-
ment in favor of exceptional measures 
being valid when states find themselves 
engaged in an "exceptional" struggle. 
Writing of the events at sea in 1689, 
Samuel Puffendorf acknowledged that 
powers engaged in defense of the religi-
ous liberty of Europe were not required 
to observe ordinary rules of capture; 
again in 1792, it was claimed, with some 
justice, that "extraordinary rigours were 
justifiable against a regicide government 
[France], who were themselves con-
temptuous of the law of nations.'>9 7 
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The United States is today engaged 
in an exceptional struggle for which 
there are few hard and fast rules. If we 
must act to set new precedents on the 
ground in the face of this need, we 
should equally act to set precedents on 
the seas. Both actions will stand to 
guide nations in the future. 
In the words of one commentator: 
United States naval power 
makes freedom of the seas pos-
sible. During periods of bellig-
erence, that freedom is subject to 
control The bloody Ho Chi Minh 
trail is long and winding. It begins 
at sea.9 8 
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APPENDIX I 
THE RULE OF 1756 AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE 
European mercantilist doctrine in the 18th century asserted that colonies 
existed ·only to supply the mother country with raw materials and to provide 
a market for the processed goods of the homeland. In Britain, to prevent 
encroachment by outsiders in this profitable two-way trade, a series of laws 
had been enacted to deprive outsiders of participation in colonial trade, in 
part by requiring that all such trade be carried on in ships of the British flag. 
France and others had similar regulations for the trade of their colonies. 
When war broke out among the colonial powers, as it frequently did, 
belligerent £lag ships and their cargoes became lawful prize. Under such 
circumstances, how was the mother country to continue to supply and be 
supplied by her overseas colonies? 
The answer, of course, was to carry on colonial trade using neutral £lag 
bottoms; but the right of neutral ships to carry enemy goods was itself a 
source of heated controversy among maritime powers, and even more so 
when belligerents employed neutral ships only to carry on colonial trade 
''lith out enduring the risk of confiscation associated with their own £lag. 1 
To confound this practice, British prize courts evolved what became 
known as the Rule of the War, 1756, under whiCh neutrals were prohibited, 
by confiscation if intercepted, from participating in colonial trade in war if 
such trade were denied them in peace by the laws of the mother country.2 
Hoping to evade this rule, neutrals and belligerent shippers conspired to 
make the colonial voyages in two distinct stages, the first from the colony to 
a neutral port, and the second from that port to the mother country. 
Fictitious transfers of ownership and actual or simulated transshipment of the 
cargo while in the interim port were often resorted to in order to disguise the 
true character of the voyage from intercepting cruisers. This practice 
permitted them to claim that captures made during either segment of the 
voyage were illegal, since neutral trade to and from neutral ports was always 
allowed. 
The prize courts responded with the development of the Doctrine of 
Continuous Voyage under which cargoes were condemned at any stage in the 
voyage, disregarding paper transfers and transshipments as "a fraudulent 
contrivance merely on account of the war to continue the original voyage and 
cover the goods of the enemy to their destined port."3 
IFor a general summary, see Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 
1739·1763 (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 169. The controversy on neutral 
rights stemmed from a fundamental difference between Continental and British jurists 
on the sources and character of international law. Pares (pp. 148-162) disagrees with 
other authorities who assert that the issues were resolved before this time. See 
Neutrality: the Origins, v. I., p. 247. 
2Pares, pp. 18()'204. See also Neutrality: the Origins, p. 153, where they describe the 
Rule as "one of the clearest examples of the economic basis of the law of neutral and 
belligerent rights. It was a measure adapted ... to meet a definite economic problem." 
3Decision in the case of the ship Young Gertruyde Adriane, June 1764. Quoted in 
Pares, p. 221. 
